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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose proclaims the owners’ 
commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company 
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”1  In 2012, Hobby Lobby 
filed suit arguing that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) interfered with its 
religious rights by requiring corporations to provide funding for employee 
insurance plans that cover contraception (ACA Contraception Mandate).2 
Other companies rooted in religious ideals also objected to this mandate, 
stating it violated their religious freedom.3  However, it was not clear if 
corporations had religious rights in the first place.4  
The word “corporation” is derived from the Latin word of corpus, 
which means body.5  The law has taken the origin of the word corporation to 
heart and recognized that a corporation can do many of the same things that 
a natural person can do.6  A corporation can bring lawsuits when it is 
wronged, buy and sell property, enter into contracts with others, pay taxes, 
and commit crimes.7  Corporations also enjoy many of the same rights of a 
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1. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013); cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
2. Sarah Posner, More Than a Hobby, AM. PROSPECT (July 18, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/more-
hobby; see generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 
2012). 
3. See generally Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  
4. Posner, supra note 2.  
5. Michael Spadaccini, The Basics of Business Structure, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 8, 2009), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/200516. 
6. See generally Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
7. See Spadaccini, supra note 5.  See also Jones v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 552 
S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (corporation’s suit was dismissed for its failure to pay 
franchise taxes); Great Lakes Restaurants, Inc. v. Rumery Constr. Co., 179 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Mich. 
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natural person, such as freedom of speech under the First Amendment.8 
However, corporations do not have the right to vote, which demonstrates that 
the entire spectrum of constitutional rights available to a natural person is not 
given to corporations.9  It is unknown if constitutional religious freedom 
rights will ever be extended to corporations.  If corporations do have statutory 
religious rights that are being oppressed by the ACA Contraception Mandate, 
it is also important to consider the impact on employees who will have the 
burden of providing for this healthcare shifted upon them. 
As a result of the legal uncertainty concerning corporate religious 
rights, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius.10  In light of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the Court held in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that the ACA Contraception Mandate 
substantially burdened a corporate person’s exercise of religion in a manner 
that is not the least restrictive means possible.11  Therefore, the Court allowed 
a for-profit corporation, such as Hobby Lobby, to deny its employees 
insurance coverage for contraception to which the employees are otherwise 
entitled to under the ACA Contraception Mandate.12  The Court declined to 
define the full extent of the religious rights of a corporation under the 
Constitution of the United States.13  This Comment will argue that the Court’s 
decision to invalidate the ACA Contraception Mandate, in the context of 
Burwell, is incorrect because this ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs” 
of natural person employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”).  The Court’s holding oppresses the Title VII religious rights of 
the natural person, which arise from constitutional protection, while granting 
religious protection to corporate persons, who have not been given religious 
constitutional protection by the Court.  
 This Comment will evaluate the impact of a religious corporation’s 
claim against the ACA Contraception Mandate.  The Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. line of cases presents a conflict between the religious rights of the 
corporate person and the employment rights of natural persons.  Because of 
the constitutional avoidance substantive canon, it is likely that the Court 
                                                                                                                           
Ct. App. 1970) (corporation sued for specific performance of a contract for land); State v. 
Adjustment Dep’t Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 688 (Idaho 1971) (corporation was charged 
with extortion). 
8. See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 98 (2005). 
9. Id. at 95–100. 
10. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
11. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780-81 (2014). 
12. Id. at 2785. 
13. See id.; see also John Bursch, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga: The Most Difficult-to-Answer 
Question, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/ 
symposium-hobby-lobby-and-conestoga-the-most-difficult-to-answer -question/. 
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chose not to resolve the ACA Contraception Mandate issue by declaring that 
corporations have First Amendment religious rights.14  The Court resolved 
the issue in Burwell under federal law, which rendered the ACA 
Contraception Mandate invalid because the burden it placed on religious 
corporations was not narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government 
interest.15  However, even if the Court had held that the ACA Contraception 
Mandate was valid, the ACA could exempt a company like Hobby Lobby 
from paying the ACA Contraception Mandate, which would still shift the 
burden of providing contraception to the employee.  This will generate valid 
claims against the employer from the burdened employees.  In Part II, this 
Comment will first examine the background of the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to evaluate the constitutional rights of the corporate 
person.  Second, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) will be 
examined as a statutory basis for a claim of religious discrimination against 
a corporation.  Additionally, Part II, as well as Part III, will evaluate the 
seminal cases of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell that demonstrate the 
extent of a corporation’s religious rights. Once the rights of the corporate 
person are analyzed, Part IV will explore the personal rights of the individual 
employee that are oppressed in the context of Title VII, which is the basis for 
why this Comment argues the Court’s holding in Burwell is incorrect. 
Finally, Part V will attempt to offer solutions to resolve the issues 
surrounding the ACA Contraception Mandate. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  History of Corporate Constitutional Rights 
 Over the past two hundred years, the corporation has evolved from a 
seldom-used method of doing business to one of the more powerful and 
influential social organizations.16  The rights of the modern-day corporation 
are very different and much more extensive than the rights possessed by 
corporations in the early years of the United States.17  During colonial times, 
corporations were legal entities of the states and had rights to the extent that 
they were granted by the state.18  Most businesses that existed during this 
                                                                                                                           
14. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
15. Id. at 2780. 
16. Krannich, supra note 8, at 61. 
17. Id. at 64–65. 
18. See id. at 64; Jess Bravin, Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century of Corporate Law, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125314088285517643.html (“For 
centuries, corporations have been considered beings apart from their human owners, yet sharing 
with them some attributes, such as the right to make contracts and own property.”); Trs. of 
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 635 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, 
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time were partnerships and sole proprietorships.19  The few corporations that 
existed were created by the states to serve a specific public purpose.20  The 
limited corporations are in stark contrast to modern corporations, which are 
the “preeminent economic actors in our society, operating largely in 
conformity with their own bylaws, rather than at the whim of the state.”21 
“Many commentators believe that the modern business corporation is such a 
powerful, pervasive entity that it should be viewed as a quasi-governmental 
body.”22  
 New rights enjoyed by today’s corporations arose suddenly out of Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad and Pembina Consolidated 
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania.23  The Court in Santa Clara County 
casually declared, “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion 
that it does.”24  This simple statement that lacked further justification or 
analysis gave birth to the legal fiction that a corporation is a “person” who is 
entitled to constitutional rights and protection.25  Additionally, decisions that 
stem from the Santa Clara County holding also lack a definitive explanation 
for why a corporation is a “person” entitled to Fourteenth Amendment 
protection.26 
 However, the first legally recognized corporate constitutional rights did 
not originate from the First Amendment, but rather the Equal Protection 
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
Interestingly, the Court in Pembina Consolidated Mining & Milling Co. 
declined to acknowledge a corporation as a “citizen” entitled to Privileges 
and Immunities Clause protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.28  
 The Court also extended the constitutional protection of the Fourth 
Amendment to corporations.29  In Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that 
corporations should be protected from unreasonable search and seizure under 
                                                                                                                           
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”). 
19. Krannich, supra note 8, at 61; Spadaccini, supra note 5 (“The sole proprietorship is not a legal 
entity.  It simply refers to a natural person who owns the business and is personally responsible for 
its debts . . . A partnership is a business form created automatically when two or more persons 
engage in a business enterprise for profit.”). 
20. Krannich, supra note 8, at 64. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 65. 
23. Bravin, supra note 18.  
24. Id.; see Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886).  
25. Bravin, supra note 18. 
26. Krannich, supra note 8, at 95. 
27. Id. at 94. 
28. Pembina Consol. Mining and Milling v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888). 
29. Krannich, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
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the Fourth Amendment.30  However, in Hale, the Court also decided that 
corporations did not have a right of protection against self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment.31  The extent of corporate rights under the Fifth 
Amendment are muddled by the fact that the Court has consistently held that 
corporations are entitled to Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection, but 
corporations are not granted self-incrimination protection.32  Despite the fact 
that the use of the term “persons” appears in the same context in both clauses, 
the Court has not explained why a corporation is a “person” for purposes of 
double jeopardy, but not for purposes of self-incrimination.33  Again, the 
discrepancy regarding Fifth Amendment protection demonstrates that the 
corporate “person” is not entitled to all constitutional rights that a natural 
United States citizen possesses.34  
 Recently, the Court has also extended First Amendment protection to 
corporations.35  In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s 
Consumer Council, the Court held that commercial speech, which is 
recognized as a general form of communication, is protected by the First 
Amendment.36  Since the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Court has limited the scope of constitutional protection for corporate 
speech.37  The fear of the Court is that protecting the free speech of powerful 
corporations may “dilute the marketplace of ideas.”38  This fear is particularly 
relevant in the political arena.39  In Federal Election Commission v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court struck down a federal law 
prohibiting for-profit and non-profit corporate spending linked to federal 
elections.40  However, the Court noted that the law might have been 
constitutional if designed to combat the “corrosive influence of concentrated 
corporate wealth,” but the law was invalid because non-profit corporations 
did not pose the same threat to political speech.41  Complete freedom of 
speech rights have not been granted to corporations because the Court wants 
to create a balance between freedom of speech, and not allowing powerful 
corporations to drown out all other points of view.42 
                                                                                                                           
30. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).  
31. Id. at 67. 
32. Krannich, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 98. 
36. Va. State Bd. of Pharm v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).  
37. Krannich, supra note 8, at 98-99. 
38. Id. at 98. 
39. Id. at 98–99. 
40. See Fed. Election Com’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–65 (1986). 
41. Id. at 257. 
42. Krannich, supra note 8, at 100. 
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 The history of constitutional protection for corporations is dynamic and 
continuing to evolve.43 Corporations are not entitled to all of the 
constitutional rights that a natural “person” is entitled to, specifically in the 
context of the First Amendment.44  It remains to be seen if First Amendment 
religious protection will ever be granted to the corporate “person.”   
Corporate religious protection would come from the Free Exercise Clause 
within the First Amendment, which states, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”45  It is established law that associations, and not just individuals, 
have Free Exercise religious rights.46  To explain why associations are also 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court has stated, “[a]n individual's 
freedom . . . to worship . . . could not be vigorously protected from 
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group 
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”47  For this reason, the 
Tenth Circuit extended Free Exercise rights to associations in Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., and, more specifically, to corporations.48 
B.  Explanation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act  
 The RFRA was enacted to bolster the commitment that the Framers of 
the Constitution had to the free exercise of religion.49  Religion is an 
“unalienable right” that is guaranteed to all people and should be free from 
government interference.50  The RFRA recognizes the fact that religious laws 
that are either intentionally suppressive, or neutral, may impede on the free 
exercise of religion.51  The Court’s ruling in Employment Division 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith is an example of a 
                                                                                                                           
43. See generally id. 
44. Id. at 95–100. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
46. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1133. 
47. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
48. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1133. (“First Amendment protection extends to corporations 
. . . [, and the Court] has thus rejected the argument that . . . corporations or other associations should 
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not natural 
persons.”). 
49. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
50. Id.  Congress found that,  
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an 
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; (2) 
laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended 
to interfere with religious exercise; (3) governments should not substantially burden 
religious exercise without compelling justification. 
 Id. 
51. Id. 
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neutral law hindering the free exercise of religion.52  In that case, petitioners 
sought review of an employment law ruling that classified the petitioners’ 
religious use of peyote as “misconduct.”53  The penalty for such 
“misconduct” disqualified the petitioners from receiving Oregon 
unemployment compensation benefits.54  The Court held that sacramental 
peyote use violated state drug laws, so prohibiting the use of the peyote was 
not in conflict with the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.55  Oregon 
was permitted to regulate ceremonial peyote use and deny petitioners their 
unemployment benefits based on the “misconduct” of testing positive for 
peyote.56  The ruling in Smith allowed for neutral state laws to interfere with 
the free exercise of religion, which prompted Congress to enact the RFRA.57 
“[G]overnments should not substantially burden religious exercise without 
compelling justification.”58  The RFRA provides an additional cause of 
action or affirmative defense, besides the First Amendment, for individuals 
who have had their religious rights substantially burdened by a state or 
federal law.59  
C.  ACA Contraception Mandate Litigation 
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell are paramount cases when 
analyzing the balance of corporate religious rights within the context of the 
ACA Contraception Mandate.60  There were other ACA Contraception 
Mandate cases before the Court, but the facts and arguments of Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. encompass these other cases.61  The basic argument was that 
religious for-profit companies felt that they should not have to provide for 
employee insurance under the ACA Contraception Mandate because it was a 
violation of their religious freedom.62 
 The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. were David and Barbra 
Green, who, along with their three children, are the owners and operators of 
                                                                                                                           
52. See generally Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
53. Id. at 874. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 890. 
56. Id. 
57. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
58. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3) (“[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a 
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests.”). 
59. Id. § 2000bb(a)(2). 
60. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014). 
61. See generally Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
62. Marty Lederman, Symposium: How to Understand Hobby Lobby, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2014, 
7:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-how-to-understand-hobby-lobby/. 
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc.63  The Green family founded 
Hobby Lobby, which is an arts and crafts chain.64  Hobby Lobby is an S-
corporation65 and is comprised of over five hundred stores and approximately 
thirteen thousand full-time employees.66  The Greens also founded Mardel, 
an affiliated chain of thirty-five Christian bookstores with approximately 
four hundred full-time employees.67  Both companies are family run on a for-
profit basis.68  Furthermore, the Greens make business decisions for both 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel with religious faith as an important 
consideration.69 
 Hobby Lobby is organized within a religious framework.70  Hobby 
Lobby’s statement of purpose proclaims that one of the company’s objectives 
is to maintain a commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating 
the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”71  Mardel 
shares a similar commitment to religious principles in its own business 
statement of purpose.72 Examples of corporate decisions based on faith 
include closing Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores on Sundays and not 
allowing business activities that advertise alcohol.73 
 Additionally, the Greens finance the operation of Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel through the use of a management trust, which mandates that trust 
funds for business activities be used in a way that promotes the corporations’ 
commitment to faith.74  One such religious ideal that Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel seek to promote is the belief that human life begins when sperm 
                                                                                                                           
63. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122.  
64. Id. 
65. S Corporations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/S-
Corporations (last updated Jan. 15, 2015) 
S corporations are corporations that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, 
and credits through to their shareholders for federal tax purposes.  Shareholders of S 
corporations report the flow-through of income and losses on their personal tax returns 
and are assessed tax at their individual income tax rates.  This allows S corporations to 
avoid double taxation on the corporate income.  S corporations are responsible for tax 
on certain built-in gains and passive income at the entity level. 
 Id. 
66. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (“Similarly, Mardel, which sells exclusively Christian books and materials, describes itself as ‘a 
faith-based company dedicated to renewing minds and transforming lives through the products we 
sell and the ministries we support.’”). 
73. Id. (“Hobby Lobby buys hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to ‘know Jesus as 
Lord and Savior.’”). 
74. Id. (“The trustees must sign ‘a Trust Commitment,’ which among other things requires them to 
affirm the Green family statement of faith and to ‘regularly seek to maintain a close intimate walk 
with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in His Word and prayer.’”). 
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fertilizes an egg and that it is immoral to cause the death of a human 
embryo.75  
D.  Analysis of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2013) 
 The Tenth Circuit underwent a highly subjective analysis of the 
business structure and company philosophy of Hobby Lobby and Mardel to 
determine that the plaintiffs’ businesses had legitimate religious convictions 
that could potentially be violated.76 The court acknowledged that not every 
company would qualify as a religious company in order to bring a claim 
against the ACA Contraception Mandate.77 The following analysis was done 
by the Tenth Circuit in the context that the plaintiff was a religious business.78 
 In order to maintain their corporate religious convictions, the plaintiffs 
sought relief from required employer compliance with sections of the ACA 
that obligated companies to provide insurance that pays for “preventive care 
and screenings” for women.79  The ACA does not specifically state what 
“preventive care and screening” healthcare services women are entitled to 
under the ACA.80  However, the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), which is a Health and Human Services Agency 
(HHS) authorized by the ACA to promulgate regulations, has declared that 
contraception for women is within the intended scope of “preventive care and 
screenings.”81  To comply with the ACA, employers must provide insurance 
that pays for contraception methods approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration.82  The approved contraception methods include intrauterine 
                                                                                                                           
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1120. 
78. Id. at 1128. 
79. Id. at 1122 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). 
80. Id. at 1123 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). 
81. Id.; see also The Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (“[W]ith 
respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration for purposes of this paragraph.”). 
82. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123; Group Health Plans and Health Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventative Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147).  The regulation provides,  
These preventive health services include, with respect to women, preventive care and 
screening provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) that were issued on August 1, 2011 
(HRSA Guidelines). As relevant here, the HRSA Guidelines require coverage, without 
cost sharing, for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraception 
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women 
with reproductive capacity.’ 
 Id. 
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devices and emergency contraception that is referred to as Plan B and Ella.83 
These methods prevent pregnancy by interfering with the implantation of a 
fertilized egg.84  The plaintiffs asserted that funding any activity that 
interferes with a fertilized egg is a violation of their corporate religious 
beliefs.85  HRSA has allowed exemptions for certain employers, mostly 
religious non-profit organizations, from the requirement that they must 
provide insurance that pays for contraception.86  However, the plaintiffs were 
not covered by any HRSA regulations that would exempt them from the ACA 
Contraception Mandate.87  
 The plaintiffs’ cause of action arose under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment and the RFRA.88  “A plaintiff makes a prima facie case 
under RFRA by showing that the government substantially burdens a sincere 
religious exercise.”89 If this is accomplished, the burden of proof shifts to the 
government to show that a “compelling” government interest is 
accomplished through the application of the scrutinized law to the individual 
“person.”90 The RFRA states that the “Government shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion.”91  
 The Tenth Circuit held that, for the purposes of the RFRA, the 
plaintiffs’ corporations were defined as “persons.”92  The court looked to the 
text of the RFRA to support its decision.93  While the text of the RFRA does 
not define “person,” the Dictionary Act does offer a definition of “person.”94 
The Dictionary Act states “[T]he meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise . . . ‘person’ . . . include[s] ‘corporations’, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals.”95  The Court has also agreed with this 
interpretation of the word “person” in the context of the RFRA.96 However, 
the Tenth Circuit felt that there was a possibility that the Dictionary Act did 
not address the distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations.97 
To ensure that the RFRA applies to for-profit corporations, such as the 
                                                                                                                           
83. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1125. 
86. Id. at 1123–24. 
87. Id. at 1124. 
88. Id. at 1125. 
89. Id. at 1125–26. 
90. Id. at 1126. 
91. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1128–29. 
94. Id. at 1129. 
95. Id. (emphasis added). 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  
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plaintiffs, the court turned to existing corporate statutes to assist in their 
construction of “person.”98 
 The court looked at other corporate statutes because, if the “context” 
offers a different construction of “person” than the Dictionary Act, then the 
context definition of “person” would be applied.99  Statutes that are in 
“context” contain exemptions for religious employers, which include Title 
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the National Labor Relations 
Act.100  The court reasoned that the text of these statutes did not provide 
support for the exclusion of a for-profit corporation from the RFRA, but 
instead showed that Congress knew how to draft a corporate religious 
exclusion.101  The court reasoned that Congress intentionally chose not to 
include a corporate religious exclusion into the RFRA.102  For example, in 
Title VII, “the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion does not 
apply to an employer that is ‘a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society.’”103  The court concluded that in this “context,” if a 
corporate religious exclusion for a for-profit company was not present, then 
it did not apply.104  The court also evaluated case law that did not exclude 
for-profit companies from the scope of the definition of “person” in the 
RFRA.105  The court concluded that there was no persuasive authority that 
indicated that Congress meant “person” in the RFRA to have a different 
definition than the default definition found in the Dictionary Act, which 
includes all corporations within the scope of the meaning of “person.”106 
 Once the court determined that a “person” under the RFRA could be a 
for-profit corporation, it still had to decide if the ACA Contraception 
Mandate constituted a substantial burden upon the corporation because of its 
religious convictions.107  The court examined whether a substantial burden 
was present by weighing three factors, which are if the government legal 
obligation “(1) ‘requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely 
held religious belief,’ (2) “prevents participation in conduct motivated by a 
sincerely held religious belief,” or (3) ‘places substantial pressure . . . to 
engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.’”108   
                                                                                                                           
98. Id. at 1130. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1131–32. 
106. Id. at 1132. 
107. Id. at 1137. 
108. Id. at 1138; see generally Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the 
RFRA balancing test when Madyun Abdulhaseeb, a Muslim prisoner, raised a religious objection 
to the lack of halal dietary options available in his prison). 
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 The court first identified the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs.109  The 
plaintiffs argued that under the ACA Contraception Mandate they must 
provide insurance coverage that provides for contraception that interferes 
with a fertilized egg, which is against their religious beliefs.110  Second, the 
court determined if this corporate belief was sincere.  In this case, a subjective 
analysis of the plaintiffs’ corporations convinced the court that the belief was 
sincere.111  Third, the court determined if the burden placed on the plaintiff 
by the government was substantial.112  The court reasoned that the non-
compliance fines that the plaintiffs would be subjected to if they did not 
provide the contraception insurance to their employees would constitute a 
substantial burden.113  The court held that there was a substantial burden upon 
the plaintiffs because of the ACA Contraception Mandate.114  
 The final issue the court addressed was whether the government had a 
compelling interest that was exercised in the least restrictive manner 
possible.115  The government interests asserted by the ACA Contraception 
Mandate are public health and gender equality.116  The court reasoned that 
the interests were not compelling for two reasons.117  The first reason was 
that the interests were too broad.118  Second, the interests were not compelling 
because the contraception insurance requirement did not apply to the 
population as a whole, so portraying the ACA Contraception Mandate as 
widespread societal aid was not convincing to the court.119  Even if the 
                                                                                                                           
109. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1140 (“The corporate plaintiffs believe life begins at 
conception.  Thus, they have what they describe as ‘a sincere religious objection to providing 
coverage for Plan B and Ella since they believe those drugs could prevent a human embryo . . . from 
implanting in the wall of the uterus, causing the death of the embryo.’”). 
110. Id. (“The government does not dispute the corporations’ sincerity, and we see no reason to question 
it either.”). 
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 1140–41. 
113. Id. (“Here, it is difficult to characterize the pressure as anything but substantial.  To the extent 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel provide a health plan, they would be fined $100 per employee, per 
day . . . With over 13,000 employees, that comes to more than $1.3 million per day, or close to $475 
million per year.  And if Hobby Lobby and Mardel simply stop offering a health plan—dropping 
health insurance for more than 13,000 employees—then the companies must pay about $26 million 
per year.”).  See also Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (2012) (“The amount of the 
tax imposed by subsection (a) on any failure shall be $100 for each day in the noncompliance period 
with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.”). 
114. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1142. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1143. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1143–44. 
Second, the interest here cannot be compelling because the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement presently does not apply to tens of millions of people.  As noted above, this 
exempted population includes those working for private employers with grandfathered 
plans, for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and, under a proposed rule, for 
2015]  Comment 335 
 
 
government had presented compelling interests, these interests were not 
narrowly tailored in the court’s opinion.120  There are other contraception 
methods that the plaintiffs must provide insurance for under the ACA 
Contraception Mandate that do not involve interference with a fertilized 
egg.121  The plaintiffs did not oppose providing insurance for these 
methods.122  Rather, the plaintiffs did not want to provide insurance coverage 
for the methods that interfere with a fertilized egg.123  The court felt that 
allowing for this exemption would not frustrate the goal of providing 
preventative care for women under the ACA.124  As it was written, the court 
felt the ACA Contraception Mandate was too broad.125 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. was granted certiorari by the Supreme 
Court.126  Oral argument before the Court was made in the combined cases 
of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. on 
March 25, 2014.127  During oral argument, the Justices voiced concern over 
the fact that either the healthcare rights of female employees or the religious 
rights of companies would be oppressed by the decision.128  However, Justice 
Antonin Scalia pointed out that the RFRA does not provide for third party 
rights, such as those of the female workers.129  Justices Elena Kagan and 
Sonia Sotomayor also pointed out that finding in favor of Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. could create a “slippery slope” that could provide the framework 
for companies to continually challenge and unravel the entirety of the 
ACA.130  A final important question came from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
who inquired as to how the Court could avoid the First Amendment issue of 
                                                                                                                           
colleges and universities run by religious institutions . . . they would leave unprotected 
all women who work for exempted business entities. 
 Id. 
120. Id. at 1144. 
121. Id. (“Hobby Lobby and Mardel ask only to be excused from covering four contraceptive methods 
out of twenty, not to be excused from covering contraception altogether.  The government does not 
articulate why accommodating such a limited request fundamentally frustrates its goals.”). 
122. Id. at 1125. 
123. Id. at 1143–44. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).   
127. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: One Hearing, Two Dramas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:50 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-recap-one-hearing-two-dramas/. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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the ACA Contraception Mandate’s impact on the right of a corporation to 
exercise religion.131  The Court issued its opinion on June 30, 2014.132  
 The Court’s opinion in Burwell has a profound impact on the rights of 
religious corporations, like Hobby Lobby, and their employees.  Following 
much of the same analysis as the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs prevailed under their RFRA claim and that the ACA Contraception 
Mandate was invalid.133  However, to reach this conclusion, the Court did not 
extend the right of constitutional religious protection to the corporate person 
under the Free Exercise Clause.134  This opinion does not overrule the Tenth 
Circuit’s holding that that religious corporations are entitled to constitutional 
religious protection because the Court likely used the substantive canon of 
constitutional avoidance to not rule on the issue.135  The constitutional 
avoidance canon provides that “The Court will not pass [rule] upon a 
constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon 
which the case may be disposed of.”136  In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., there 
was both a constitutional question, which was whether corporations have 
protectable First Amendment religious rights, and also the “other ground” of 
the RFRA upon which to resolve the case.         
 The Court agreed with the extensive statutory construction done by the 
Tenth Circuit and concluded that a for-profit corporation is a “person” who 
may bring a claim for religious discrimination under the RFRA.137  However, 
the Court stated that the applicability of this decision to for-profit 
corporations is narrow because it only applies to for-profit corporations with 
“sincere religious beliefs.”138  Despite providing important means of 
contraception to female employees, the Court felt the ACA Contraception 
Mandate imposed a substantial burden upon the religious corporation, 
because it forced employers to pay for methods of contraception that were 
contrary to the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs.139  Additionally, the Court 
chose not to preserve the ACA Contraception Mandate on the grounds that it 
was narrowly tailored towards serving a compelling government interest.140 
                                                                                                                           
131. Id. 
132. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
133. Id. at 2785. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 269 (Robert C. 
Clark et al. eds., 2010). 
137. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1132. 
138. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 at F.3d 1122 (detailed subjective 
analysis by the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. shows that a limited number of companies 
can bring a religious claim against the ACA Contraception Mandate.  It seems that the Tenth Circuit 
was looking for written statements and company practices to determine if there was a legitimate 
corporate religious interest). 
139. Burwell, 132 S. Ct. at 2775–79. 
140. Id. at 2780. 
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The Court felt that the government has other means of providing the lost 
benefit to female employees under the ACA Contraception Mandate without 
burdening their religious employers by violating their religious rights under 
the RFRA.141 This reasoning shifts the cost of contraception to an undefined 
third party and forces female employees to seek contraception coverage 
outside of their employer provided group health plan.142 
 Besides the corporations that may be exempt from the ACA 
Contraception Mandate under the rules articulated by the Court in Burwell, 
the HSRA may establish exemptions for “religious employers” who do not 
have to provide the disputed contraception insurance.143 Therefore, the scope 
of the term “religious employers” is in flux, and could eventually encompass 
more employers than the narrow ruling in Burwell. The Dissent of Burwell 
recognized that this trend imposes a substantial burden upon women because 
“[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life 
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.”144 The invalidation of the ACA Contraception Mandate in Burwell 
overrides significant interests of the corporations’ employees and denies 
access to contraception coverage otherwise provided by the ACA to women 
who do not hold their employers’ beliefs.145 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 The Court’s holding in Burwell will likely have a negative downstream 
impact on female employees. Not only is an important method of 
contraception now unavailable to female employees of corporations like 
Hobby Lobby, but the Court has also allowed these corporations to impose 
their own moral choice upon their employees. The Court’s decision to 
invalidate the ACA Contraception Mandate, in the context of Burwell, is 
incorrect because this ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs” of natural 
person employees under Title VII.  The Court’s holding oppresses the Title 
VII religious rights of the natural person, which arise from constitutional 
protections, while granting religious protection to corporate persons, who 
have not been given religious constitutional protection by the Court.   
A.  Employee Religious Rights Under Title VII 
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell bring up an interesting employee 
rights issue that was not explored in-depth by the Tenth Circuit or the 
                                                                                                                           
141. Id. at 2780–82. 
142. Id. 
143. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123-24. 
144. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 2790. 
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Supreme Court but was addressed in oral arguments before the Court.146  The 
issue is that religious corporations suppress employees’ religious rights when 
the company decides for the employees that certain forms of contraception 
are immoral and should not be provided in a group health plan.  The Tenth 
Circuit stated, “Finally, we note a concern raised both at oral argument and 
in the government’s briefing that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are, in effect, 
imposing their religious views on their employees or otherwise burdening 
their employees’ religious beliefs.”147  This is an issue that has widespread 
relevance in ACA cases where the employer opposes a mandate under the 
ACA or when a company is granted an exemption by the HSRA. The burden 
of cost is then shifted to the employees, who have had their own rights 
oppressed. This issue will be explored in the context of Title VII.  
 Title VII is a paramount statute that must be considered when 
evaluating possible oppression of employee rights.148  The overall purpose of 
Title VII is to forbid an employer from discriminating against an employee 
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.149  Title VII also 
requires that employers reasonably accommodate employees’ sincerely held 
religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the employer’s business.150  The overall theme of Title VII is 
that employees have certain rights that cannot be denied to them by their 
employers.151  
 The exercise of corporate religious rights has the potential to deny 
employee rights under Title VII.  Enforcement of employee rights falls to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is the agency 
that is delegated authority to enforce Title VII against non-compliant 
employers.152  EEOC Guidance materials indicate that Title VII’s prohibition 
against disparate treatment of employees based on religion is broad and can 
be applied to a variety of circumstances.153  EEOC Regulations also set a 
broad scope for what may constitute a religious belief, practice, or 
observance.154  This broad scope is consistently applied in EEOC Regulation 
violation suits by courts that need to determine if a religious interest is at 
                                                                                                                           
146. Denniston, supra note 127. 
147. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1144–45 (“Accommodations for religion frequently operate 
by lifting a burden from the accommodated party and placing it elsewhere.”). 
148. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1-17) (2012). 
149. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (2014), http://www.eeoc.gov. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (“Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices.  The 
Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any 
unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title [section 703 
or 704].”). 
153. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 149. 
154. Guidelines and Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2001). 
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stake.155  EEOC Regulations state, “[i]n most cases whether or not a practice 
or belief is religious is not at issue.  However, in those cases in which the 
issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include 
moral or ethical beliefs . . . .”156  Title VII protects the religious beliefs, or 
lack thereof, of employees when employers are exercising control over their 
employees.157  
 This is relevant to the Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell litigation 
because the plaintiffs sought to deny employees their right to contraception 
coverage under the ADA.158 While wanting contraception healthcare is 
obviously not a traditional “religious belief,” it is likely that the scope of Title 
VII is broad enough to cover this encroachment upon employee rights.159  If 
an employee decides that birth control is a preventative measure that the 
woman would like to take, this entails a moral decision by the woman.160  As 
stated in the EEOC Regulations, moral beliefs are protected from employer 
infringement under Title VII.161  In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell, 
the employer decided that providing contraception coverage for employees 
was morally wrong, even though some female employees do not have a moral 
objection to the contraception.162  This is a violation of Title VII because an 
employer has denied employees a right that is entitled to employees under 
the ACA because of corporate religious beliefs.163  Specifically, Title VII 
Prohibited Practices outlines several benefits that cannot be denied by 
employers on the basis of religion.164  Among the benefits that cannot be 
denied are insurance benefits.165  The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
and Burwell showed no regard for the contrary moral or religious beliefs of 
their employees. 
                                                                                                                           
155. Id. 
156. Id.; see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185–86 (1965).  
[T]he statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a ‘merely 
personal moral code’ . . . We have construed the statutory definition broadly and it 
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B.  Title VII Case Law Supports an Employee’s Claim in the Context of 
Hobby Lobby Stores 
 The issue of whether an employer needs to provide insurance for 
contraception is not a new issue and has been litigated in the past.  In Willett 
v. Emory and Henry College, the court evaluated whether an employee could 
recover under Title VII if the employee was discriminatorily denied benefits 
under the employer’s group health plan.166  Pursuant to the terms of the 
female employee’s employment contract with her employer, “the plaintiff 
was eligible to participate in a group health insurance plan, which provided 
dependent benefits to the spouses and children of employees.”167  The policy 
included benefit payments for surgical treatment for pregnancy and related 
disabilities.168  The plaintiff enrolled in the group health plan and was denied 
coverage after a surgery that required pregnancy insurance benefits.169  The 
court found the benefits had not been denied to the employee based on her 
pregnancy and gender, but rather because the plaintiff was not in full 
compliance with the terms of the group health plan.170  For this reason, the 
court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to Title VII relief.171  The opinion 
seems to indicate that the case may have been more favorable to the plaintiff 
under Title VII if the plaintiff had been in compliance with her health plan, 
similar to employees in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and the benefits were still 
denied.172  
 A similar issue was considered under Title VII in EEOC v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., the plaintiff was a United Parcel Service (UPS) 
employee.173  He was denied coverage for his wife’s prescription for an oral 
contraception.174  The plaintiff’s wife was prescribed the oral contraception 
to treat an incapacitating female hormonal disorder.175  The health plan 
benefits of UPS excluded coverage of oral contraception for all purposes, 
including treatment of female hormonal disorders.176  
 As a result, the EEOC brought suit and alleged that UPS engaged in 
unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII by providing a health 
                                                                                                                           
166. See Willett v. Emory & Henry Coll., 427 F. Supp. 631, 633 (W.D. Vir. 1977).  
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benefit plan that discriminated against its employees because of their sex.177 
According to the EEOC, UPS discriminated against female employees by 
refusing to provide them with coverage for hormonal treatment while male 
employees were eligible to receive coverage for hormonal treatment.178  
Additionally, the EEOC argued that UPS discriminated against male 
employees because UPS failed to provide the spouses of male employees 
with the same coverage that it provided to spouses of female employees who 
were entitled to the hormonal coverage.179  UPS asserted that the exclusion 
was gender neutral, because neither female employees nor spouses of male 
employees were covered for oral contraception.180  The EEOC also argued 
that UPS’s exclusion of coverage for prescription contraception had a 
disparate impact on females because of their sex.181  The court held that Title 
VII prohibits employers from engaging in employment practices that are 
facially neutral but are discriminatory in operation.182  The court determined 
that even if UPS’s plan was unlawful, it had a disparate impact on women 
because only women could benefit from the treatment.183  The court 
considered UPS’s argument that its benefits coverage negated the claim 
because both female employees and spouses of male employees were not 
covered under the insurance exclusion of oral contraception.184  The court 
considered the argument that because only females can be prescribed the oral 
contraception, the facially neutral exclusion was harsher on female 
employees.185  The court held that the EEOC sufficiently pled a disparate 
impact claim based on the above arguments and allegations.186  
 The court addressed a similar issue in In re Union Pacific Railroad 
Employment Practices.  The defendant, Union Pacific, provided healthcare 
benefits to its employees who were covered by collective bargaining 
agreements.187  The plans excluded all types of both male and female 
contraception methods when the contraception was used for the sole purpose 
of contraception.188  Union Pacific only covered contraception when 
medically necessary for a non-contraception purpose, such as regulating 
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menstrual cycles.189  The plaintiff female employees brought suit against 
Union Pacific alleging that the defendants discriminated against its female 
employees by not providing coverage of prescription contraception in 
violation of Title VII.190  Union Pacific argued that a requirement to cover 
prescription contraception would have a large financial impact; that the 
denial of all contraception results in equal treatment of men and women; that 
contraception deals with fertility and is not a medical condition “related to” 
pregnancy; that Union Pacific’s covered benefits are treatment-related, not 
preventive; and that there was no medical need for contraception regarding 
fertility because pregnancy is a normal human condition.191  The court 
compared the scope of the applicable health benefit to men and women in the 
context of denying contraception coverage.192  The court held that there was 
no violation of Title VII because both men and women were denied 
contraception.193  In the court’s Title VII analysis, the question of disparate 
costs to men and women during pregnancy was not addressed.194  The 
common theme of the above Title VII cases is that when a company denies 
specific treatment insurance coverage to a particular class of employees, such 
as females, a valid Title VII claim may arise.  
C.  Employee Recourse Under Title VII 
 Overall, the Title VII caselaw shows that a legitimate claim can be made 
against an employer when contraception is denied to the employees as part 
of a health insurance benefits plan.  It seems likely that invalidating the ACA 
Contraception Mandate could constitute a Title VII violation.  Title VII was 
enacted to protect the rights of the individual employee in the face of various 
forms of discrimination.  The denial of contraception coverage is an 
infringement upon an employee’s protected Title VII religious belief.  Since 
EEOC Regulations set a broad scope for what a “religious belief” actually 
means in a practical sense, it is likely that choosing to use contraception 
constitutes a moral decision.  EEOC caselaw has held that the employee may 
regard a religious right as any moral choice.  Lack of religious conviction 
also constitutes a “religious belief.” Therefore, the choice to take 
contraception comes down to a moral choice.  The woman can either decide 
that it is not a conflict with her personal religious beliefs to use contraception; 
the woman could believe in a religion that is not at odds with contraception 
in the first place; or the woman could actively not believe in religion at all, 
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which would make any religious conflict regarding contraception moot. 
Regardless, using contraception involves a moral choice of some kind.  This 
is not unlike using any other sort of medicine.  For example, some groups of 
people believe that manmade medicine should not be used.195  This is a 
religious or moral choice.  A person who chooses to use medicine is making 
a decision not to comply with the beliefs of the non-medicine using group. 
The belief still prompted the person to act in a certain way, which constitutes 
a moral choice.  The Court’s holding in Burwell infringes upon the Title VII 
religious rights of the natural person, which arise from established First 
Amendment religious protection, in order to protect the religious rights of a 
corporation.  This is an incorrect application of law because the Court has 
never held that a corporation has constitutional religious rights.  As it stands 
now, the Court is left with a conflict between the laws of Title VII and the 
RFRA. 
 Invalidating the ACA Contraception Mandate also imposes a disparate 
negative impact on female employees.  Only women will be denied the 
benefit of emergency contraception that their fellow female employees at 
different corporations will be entitled to under the ACA Contraception 
Mandate.  Invalidating the ACA Contraception Mandate places a burden 
upon the natural person, as opposed to the abstract corporate person. 
 In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell the plaintiffs interfered with 
employees’ statutory right to contraception healthcare insurance.  The RFRA 
acknowledges that this kind of litigation usually has the end result of shifting 
the burden from one group to another.  The problem is never totally resolved. 
Here, the burden is shifted to the employees, but it seems likely that Title VII 
provides the employees with a possible recourse to recover their lost and 
oppressed rights. 
V.  RESOLUTION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE 
 The Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell cases present a conflict 
between the religious rights of the corporation and the employment rights of 
natural persons.  The most direct way to resolve this issue is for the Court to 
rule that corporations have religious rights that are protected under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  This ruling would provide a 
legitimate basis for oppressing the Title VII rights of natural persons.  Both 
employees and employers would then know the full scope of their rights 
under the ACA Contraception Mandate because both parties would have 
religious rights protected under the Free Exercise Clause.  The current 
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religious rights of a corporation, assuming it is deemed a religious 
corporation by a court, are merely statutory.   
 Now that the ACA Contraception Mandate has been invalidated by the 
Court, it is imperative that employers who are exempt from providing 
contraception disclose to current and prospective employees that the burden 
of providing for contraception falls to the employees.  Employees will then 
be able to make an informed decision as to whether the lack of ACA 
Contraception Coverage changes their decision to work for the particular 
company.  
 One possible solution that may protect the rights of all parties is the 
creation of a trust designed to provide for the contraception coverage 
indirectly.196  The corporations in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell are 
genuinely concerned with preserving their religious beliefs because they are 
not challenging all of the contraception methods, only the ones that interfere 
with a fertilized egg.  The solution must have the overall goal of preserving 
the religious freedom of the corporation and the employment and moral rights 
of the individual.  To do this, the HRSA can create a federal ACA trust to 
administer the contraception benefits, instead of the company directly. 
Companies that want to be exempt from the ACA Contraception Mandate 
acknowledge that they want to be exempt for a religious reason.  The 
company then pays the equivalent amount of money that they would have 
paid the employee, or an adjusted yearly average, into a trust.  Employees 
then file their ACA Contraception Mandate needs directly with the trust, 
which pays out the coverage.  The remainder of the funds are distributed back 
to the companies who paid into the trust, or used to support charities specified 
by the paying corporate directors.  With this model, the employees get the 
needed contraception under the ACA Contraception Mandate through the 
trust, and the companies do not directly pay for contraception to which they 
are religiously opposed.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 The Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Burwell cases present a conflict 
between the religious rights of the corporate person and the employment and 
religious rights of natural persons.  The Court likely did not resolve the ACA 
Contraception Mandate issue by declaring that corporations have First 
Amendment religious rights because of the constitutional avoidance 
substantive canon.  Burwell was decided under the RFRA.  The Court ruled 
that the ACA Contraception Mandate substantially burdened a corporate 
person’s exercise of religion in a manner that is not the least restrictive means 
                                                                                                                           
196. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (ACA regulations provide for a similar compromise, but the employee 
is still excluded from the company’s group health plan). 
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possible.  Therefore, the Court allowed a for-profit corporation, such as 
Hobby Lobby, to deny its employees the insurance coverage for 
contraception to which the employees are otherwise entitled to under the 
ACA Contraception Mandate.  The Burwell decision is incorrect because this 
ruling infringes upon the “religious beliefs” of natural persons under Title 
VII.  The Court’s holding oppresses the Title VII religious rights of the 
natural person, which arise from constitutional protections, while granting 
religious protection to corporate persons, who have not been given religious 
constitutional protection by the Court.  Invalidating the ACA Contraception 
Mandate shifts the burden of providing for contraception to the employees, 
which will generate valid Title VII claims against the employer from the 
burdened employees. 
 
      
